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TOURO LAW REVIEW
However, since New York's regulation did not violate a
fundamental right or impinge on a suspect class, it is almost
certain that the result would have been the same under the
Federal Constitution.
WYOMING COUNTY
People v. Ayers 14 0
(decided January 6, 1995)
The defendant claimed that statements he made to the sheriff's
department were obtained in violation of the Due Process Clauses
of the Federal1 41 and New York State 142 Constitutions. The
defendant contended that his motion to suppress should have been
granted because the statements he made to the Sheriff were
involuntary and/or untrustworthy, by virtue of the defendant's
deficient mental state. 143 The Supreme Court, Wyoming County,
found that, absent official coercion, the defendant's mental
condition alone did not render the statements involuntary. 144
Furthermore, the People had proven the voluntariness of his
statements beyond a reasonable doubt, thus vitiating any violation
of the defendant's due process rights. 145
The defendant was interviewed after a homicide team
investigation labeled him a suspect in the murder of Charles
programs remain within the discretion of appropriate state boards, and are not
within federal cognizance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the regulations deny
an athlete a constitutionally protected right or classify him or her on a suspect
basis." Albach, 531 F.2d at 985.
140. 163 Misc. 2d 739, 622 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. Wyoming County 1995).
141. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision states in relevant part:
"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . ." Id.
142. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states in relevant part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
143. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 740, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 745, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
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Wells. 146 Two detectives went to the defendant's home, informed
him that he was a suspect in the murder and asked if he would
answer some questions. 147 The defendant accompanied the
officers to the Sheriff s Department voluntarily. 148
Although the defendant was not taken into custody, the officers
gave him his Miranda warnings as a matter of precaution. 149 The
defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights and,
thereafter, decided not to have an attorney present during the
interview. 150 In response to the officers' questions, the defendant
gave "rambling" answers to some questions and refused to
answer others. 151 After the interview, the defendant was escorted
home by one of the officers. 152
The investigation into the homicide continued and,
approximately two weeks later, the defendant was interviewed a
second time. 153 At this interview, the defendant's answers were
similar to those of the first interview, however, he was more
"communicative" and made statements that tended to incriminate
146. Id. at 740, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
147. Id.
148. Id. The defendant did not contest the fact that the interviews were non-
custodial. Id. at 741, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 213. See People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d
585, 590-91, 256 N.E.2d 172, 176, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 861 (1969) (holding
that the fact the defendant was interviewed at the police station did not mean
he was in custody, and that the determinative standard was whether a
"reasonable man, innocent of any crime" would have believed he was in
custody).
149. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 741, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 213. When a defendant
is merely being interviewed, voluntarily accompanies the officers, and is not
taken into custody, Miranda warnings are not required. Id. See People v.
Stebbins, 152 A.D.2d 946, 543 N.Y.S.2d 598 (4th Dep't 1989); see also
People v. Flint, 151 A.D.2d 964, 965, 542 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (4th Dep't 1989)
("Although defendant may have felt obligated to cooperate with the police in
order to appear innocent, that subjective view by defendant does not require a
finding that he was in custody .... "); People v. McNeely, 77 A.D.2d 205,
433 N.Y.S.2d 293 (4th Dep't 1980).
150. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 741, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Again, the defendant was given his Miranda warnings, although
not in official custody, and chose not to have an attorney. Id.
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him in the murder. 154 Notwithstanding the nature of these
statements, the defendant was again released. 155
Thereafter, the defendant was charged with the crime and he
moved to suppress the self-incriminating statements at his
trial. 156 The motion to suppress was based upon the premise that
the defendant's mental incapacity, at the time, rendered the
implicating statements involuntary and as a result they could not
be introduced at trial without denying him his right to due
process. 157
The defendant relied primarily on the United States Supreme
Court holding in Blackburn v. Alabama158  for this
proposition. 159 In Blackburn, the Court found that statements
made by a defendant suffering from mental incapacity did not
constitute acts of volition, 160 and, therefore, their admission at
trial in order to obtain a conviction deprived the defendant of due
process. 161 The Supreme Court in this case, however, was
persuaded by the fact that the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's confession made the possibility of its voluntariness
remote. 162 Consequently, the Court held that the defendant's
history of mental infirmity, together with the unduly coercive
circumstances under which the confession was obtained, caused
its admission at trial to be an "egregious" denial of due
process. 163
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 740, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
157. Id. at 740-41, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 213-14.
158. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
159. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 741, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
160. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 211.
161. Id. at 210.
162. Id. at 205, 207-08. The circumstances among which the Court
considered included "the eight to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny
room which was upon occasion literally filled with police officers; the absence
of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel; the composition of the
confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn .... " Id. at 207-
08.
163. Id. at 208.
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3
et al.: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
DUE PROCESS
The Ayers court found that evidence of such overreaching, as
displayed in Blackburn, was not present in this case. 164 As such,
the court began its analysis with the Supreme Court's holding in
Colorado v. Connelly. 165 In Connelly, the Court reasoned that
official coercion was a necessary predicate to a finding of
involuntariness. 166 A defendant's mental ailment, independent of
other evidence that the confession was involuntarily made, is an
insufficient basis to suppress the statements and does not amount
to a constitutional violation. 167  Moreover, unlike the
circumstances in Blackburn, Connelly did not involve such police
overreaching, and while the Connelly Court concluded that a
defendant's mental condition is among factors to be considered in
determining the voluntariness and/or the validity of a confession,
it is not dispositive. 168 As such, the Ayers court, finding no
evidence of coercion on the part of the Sheriff's Department,
concluded that the admission of the defendant's statements did
not "run afoul the Federal Constitution." 169
Support for the suppression of involuntary confessions under
the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution is
expounded in the case of People v. Adams. 17 0 Relying on the
decision in Blackburn, the Adams court analogized statements
made by mentally ill defendants to those made by persons who
were intoxicated at the time the statements were made. 171 In
People v. Schompert,172 wherein the defendant confessed under
the influence of alcohol and had a "history of psychosis," the
court held that absent coercive tactics by police officers, such
164. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 740-41, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
165. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
166. Id. at 167. The Court based its decision on the fact that in order to
assert a constitutional violation, state action is required. Id. at 165. See Bron,
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284-86 (1936) (finding that murder convictions
resting on confessions coerced by official brutality and violence violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
167. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
168. Id. at 165.
169. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 742-43, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
170. 26 N.Y.2d 129, 257 N.E.2d 610, 309 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1970).
171. Id. at 137, 257 N.E.2d at 613, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
172. 19 N.Y.2d 300, 226 N.E.2d 305, 279 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1967).
1996] 823
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statements may still be suppressed.173 Since the facts in
Schompert indicated that his intoxication was self-induced, the
court focused upon the trustworthiness of the defendant's
confession and, consequently, found no constitutional
violation. 174
In Ayers, the court found no evidence that coercive tactics were
used by the Sheriff's Department. However, the detectives were
found to have taken unnecessary precautions to protect the
defendant's rights. 175 The court also found no proof to
demonstrate that the defendant's resolve was subjugated or that
he did not comprehend the ramifications of his statements. 176
Therefore, the Ayers court found no violation of his due process
rights under Adams or Schompert.
However, in People v. Howard, 177 the Fourth Department held
that where there is a question as to the defendant's mental state
and the sole issue is the voluntariness of his confession, the
People still have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. 178 The Howard
173. Id. at 305, 226 N.E.2d at 307, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 518 (stating that
where questions arise as to the trustworthiness of a confession, the court
should inquire into whether "subsequent events [] confirm the reliability of the
confession").
174. Id. at 307, 226 N.E.2d at 308, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
175. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 744, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
176. Id. The court noted that a defendant who cannot comprehend his
Miranda warnings logically will not be held to understand the "nature and
consequences of his statements . . . . " Id. (citing People v. Turkenich, 137
A.D.2d 363, 369, 529 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389 (2d Dep't 1988)). However, in this
case, Miranda warnings were not required because the interviews were non-
custodial. Id. See People v. Smith, 62 N.Y.2d 306, 465 N.E.2d 336, 476
N.Y.S.2d 797 (1984); People v. Oates, 104 A.D.2d 907, 480 N.Y.S.2d 518
(2d Dep't 1984). Any challenges on this basis would consistently fail. Ayers,
163 Misc. 2d at 744, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 215. See People v. Dorsey, 118 A.D.2d
653, 499 N.Y.S.2d 806 (2d Dep't 1986).
177. 27 A.D.2d 796, 279 N.Y.S.2d 79 (4th Dep't 1967).
178. Id. at 796, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 79-80. See People v. Witherspoon, 66
N.Y.2d 973, 489 N.E.2d 758, 498 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1985); People v. Anderson,
42 N.Y.2d 35, 364 N.E.2d 1318, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1977); People v.
Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 79, 204 N.E.2d 179, 204, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 844
(1965) (holding that a defendant who wishes to challenge the voluntariness of
[Vol 12
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court stated that "[t]he failure of the People to sustain the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that such statements were
the product of a rational and meaningful act of volition require[d]
the suppression of such statements by the [c]ourt." 179 Hence, the
Ayers court found that there was no constitutional violation that
would require suppression of the confession under the New York
State Constitution and that the People had met their burden of
establishing the voluntariness of his statements. 180 Thus, the
court denied the defendant's motion because due process had not
been violated. 181
Although the Ayers court found no federal or state
constitutional violations, the court noted that under section
710.70 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law,182 the
defendant was not precluded from challenging the voluntariness
of his statements at trial or from requesting a charge to the
jury. 183 Thus, the court may have disregarded his statements if
the evidence supported his contention that they were involuntarily
made and untrustworthy. 184
In comparing federal decisions such as Brown, Blackburn and
Connelly to state decisions such as Adams and Schompert, there
is agreement, whether explicit or implicit, on the issue of a
defendant's constitutional rights and how those due process rights
are protected where involuntary confessions are concerned. The
his confession is entitled to a preliminary hearing on the issue); People v.
Reed, 103 A.D.2d 998, 478 N.Y.S.2d 202 (4th Dep't 1984).
179. Howard, 27 A.D.2d at 796, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 79-80.
180. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 745, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
181. Id.
182. N.Y. CRmI. PROC. LAW § 710.70(3) (McKinney 1992). This section
states in relevant part:
Even though the issue of admissibility of such evidence
was... determined adversely to the defendant upon motion, the
defendant may adduce at trial evidence and otherwise contend that the
statement was involuntarily made. In the case of a jury trial, the court
must submit such issue to the jury under instructions to disregard such
evidence upon a finding that the statement was involuntarily made.
Id.
183. Ayers, 163 Misc. 2d at 745, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
184. Id.
1996] 825
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United States Supreme Court and the New York courts are
consistent in that both require suppression of such statements
where official misconduct is shown. Once misconduct is
established, a defendant's statements may not be used against him
in obtaining a criminal conviction. However, when such police
coercion is not present, and a defendant's mental state is the
determinative factor in ascertaining the voluntariness of pre-trial
statements, the question remains as to whether suppression of
such statements is required under the New York Constitution or
whether it is simply an evidentiary issue under New York
Criminal Procedure Law.
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